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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION OF




The United States securities laws, if applied expansively, can have a
great impact on securities transactions both in the United States and
abroad In this Article, the authors examine the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the U.S. securities law. Most of the judicial activity in this
area has been concerned with the application of the antifraudprovisions
of the securities laws to the regulation of the affairs offoreign individu-
als and businesses. In order to combat fraudulent foreign securities
transactions the courts have developed very broad testsfor subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. After introducing basic princples of international law,
the authors analyze this extraterritorial application of the 1934 Act an-
t/fraud provisions. They then examine the application of other provi-
sions of the securities laws to foreign transactions and argue that the
broad tests developed under the antfraud pro visions should not be ex-
tended to these other areas of securities regulation. The authors caution
against broadly imposing US. regulatory provisions upon the internal
operations of aforein business already subject to the regulatory au-
thority of its domiciliary country.
I. INTRODUCTION
With increasing frequency foreigners are becoming concerned with the
extraterritorial application of the United States securities laws.' The Ameri-
can case law on this subject is focused on the application of the antifraud
provisions of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934
Act"). 2 In these cases the courts have developed two tests for subject matter
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reviewed in Painter, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 664 (1980); Loss, Extraterritoriality in the
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2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The provision states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
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jurisdiction over the conduct of foreign persons. The first test is based on con-
duct within the United States; the second is based on effects within the United
States of conduct occurring principally abroad. While some of the cases have
involved aspects of both the conduct test and the effects test, the line of cases
makes it clear that a court may, under proper circumstances, support subject
matter jurisdiction based either on a pure conduct test or on a pure effects test.
In this Article we analyze the line of cases arising under section 10(b), and
conclude that the two alternative tests developed by the courts reflect the likely
intent of Congress with respect to the extra-territorial application of the fed-
eral securities laws to isolated transactions, such as fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions, that have some contact with the United States. On the other hand, we
argue that the broad tests for extraterritorial application of the antifraud pro-
visions should not apply equally to other provisions of the federal securities
laws, such as the proxy rules3 or the short-swing trading provisions of section
16(b).4 Such a course of action would result in American securities laws regu-
lating the ongoing, internal affairs of a foreign business.
In making this argument we first consider the extraterritorial application
of the broker-dealer regulations to a foreign broker-dealer. Section 30(b) of
the 1934 Act5 exempts from regulation under that Act any broker-dealer that
conducts its business outside the jurisdiction of the United States. In section
30(b) Congress appears to have drawn a distinction between regulations that
would apply to the ongoing business affairs of a foreign broker-dealer, and
provisions such as section 10(b) that apply to isolated transactions that might
have an impact on the United States. In contrast to jurisdiction under section
10(b), jurisdiction under the 1934 Act over a foreign broker-dealer is based on
a test that requires both essential acts within the United States and foreseeable
effects from the conduct in question on protected United States interests.
We next turn to the extraterritorial application of section 16(b) to the in-
siders of a foreign corporation. Although the section 30(b) exemption would
not be available for most foreign corporations that have a class of securities
registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act,6 the policy underlying section
30(b) should be equally applicable to the extraterritorial application of broad
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
3. Id. § 78n; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 (1980).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
5. Id. § 78dd(b). This section provides that:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent
the evasion of this chapter.
6. Id. § 78.
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regulatory provisions such as section 16(b). Congress should be found to have
intended to extend subject matter jurisdiction under the 1934 Act to regulate
the ongoing, internal affairs of a foreign company only when the activities in
question involve essential acts within the United States and have a foreseeable
effect on United States persons or on the United States securities markets.
Thus, even when conduct within the United States, standing alone, may be
sufficient to support personal jurisdiction over a foreign company or its of-
ficers, directors, and principal stockholders, subject matter jurisdiction under
the 1934 Act to regulate the ongoing, internal affairs of such a foreign com-
pany should require, apart from conduct, a foreseeable impact on protected
United States interests.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
DOMESTIC LAW
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Customary international law recognizes that domestic law has extraterri-
torial application only in limited circumstances. While it is difficult to summa-
rize all of the intricacies involved, one should be aware of some of the basic
principles governing a state's assertion of its jurisdiction in civil and criminal
cases.
International law generally recognizes the territorial principle that a state
has subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases over anything located in its terri-
tory or over the conduct of any person, including an alien, that occurs within
the state's territory.7 In addition, conduct abroad that produces requisite ef-
fects within the state is also considered within the subject matter jurisdiction of
the state. The extraterritorial conduct and the effect must be constituent ele-
ments of the activity prescribed, and the effect of the activity must be both
substantial and a direct and foreseeable or intended result of the conduct. s It
7. Eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as REST. FOR. REL.]. Section 17 provides that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory,
whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside
the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory.
For the various recognized definitions of "territory," see id. §§ 11-16.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945); The King
v. Oliphant, [1905] 2 K.B. 67; REST. FOR. REL., supra note 7, § 18, which provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct
that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a
crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent
with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably devel-
oped legal systems.
For a discussion of the question of intent, see Akehurst, Jurisdiction in InternationalLaw, 46 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 155 (1975). See generally Rosenthal & Flowe,-4 New Approach to U.S. Enforce-
1981]
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is generally accepted that jurisdiction based upon the effects of activities
abroad includes within its provisions laws aimed at preventing conduct abroad
that would have internal effects.
International law also recognizes a state's jurisdiction over the conduct of
its nationals, wherever it may occur.9 Assuming a genuine link between the
national subject and the state, an individual is considered to have the national-
ity of the state that confers it upon him, 10 while a private legal entity has the
nationality of the state in which it is created. I The United States usually does
not rely upon this nationality principle to establish jurisdiction, although sev-
eral exceptions have been made in tax,12 trademark infringement, and anti-
trust cases. 13 It is generally recognized that, unless otherwise indicated,
United States statutory law applies only to conduct that occurs within the
country or that produces the requisite effect within the country. 14
The most widely recognized principles of international jurisdiction over
criminal activities are based upon internal conduct or effects that are constitu-
ent elements of the prescribed offense. These territorial bases of criminal ju-
maent ofAntitrust Laws.Against Foreign Cartels, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 81 (1980); Oliver,
Extraterritorial Application of United States Legislation against RestrictiPe or Unfair Trade Prac-
tices, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 380 (1957).
9. REST. FOR. REL., supra note 7, § 30:
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of the state wherever the
conduct occurs or
(b) as to the status of a national or as to an interest of a national, wherever the
thing or other subject-matter to which the interest relates is located.
(2) A state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct
affects one of its nationals.
10. Id. § 26 provides that "[aln individual has the nationality of a state that confers it upon
him provided there exists a genuine link between the state and the individual." See Nottebohm
Case, [1955] I.C.J. 4 (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala).
11. "A corporation or other private legal entity has the nationality of the state which createsit." REST. FOR. REL., supra note 7, § 27. Seenote 86 infra.
12. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 129, Reporter's Note (1971).
13. Compare Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), with Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) and Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633(2d Cir. 1956). See generally K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
(1958); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973); Note, Extra-
territorialApplication of the Antitrust Laws, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1452 (1956).
14. REST. FOR REL., supra note 7, § 38. An example of a statute clearly indicating extraterri-
torial application is 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976) (subpoena of person in foreign country).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 7, asserts that a state may not extend its jurisdiction to "prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to the conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct
affects one of its nationals." Id. § 30(2) & Illustration 5. Not all nations recognize this limitation.
France goes far beyond § 30 in article 14 of the French Civil Code, providing that it has jurisdic-
tion over aliens domiciled within France or abroad who have incurred civil liability to a French
national, regardless of his location. Article 14 does not require that the cause of action be con-
nected with France. This assertion ofjurisdiction has been highly criticized, but the French justify
it upon a claim of the necessity of providing the high quality of Frenchjustice to national subjects,
and upon the lack of a French provision establishing quasi in rem jurisdiction. Furthermore,
article 15 authorizes French jurisdiction over a French national for obligations contracted by him
in a foreign country, whether or not the other party is French. See generally H. STEINER & D.
VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 751-52 (2d ed. 1976).
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risdiction closely parallel the territorial bases of civil jurisdiction. Some
countries, however, have expanded the accepted rule and claim jurisdiction
over activities that produce internal effects that are not a constituent element
of the crime involved.15
The nationality principle establishes criminal jurisdiction of a state over
acts of its nationals abroad. International law does not require that the act be
criminal under the lex loei. 16 As with civil jurisdiction based upon nationality,
the United States and other common-law nations have been reluctant to exer-
cise such extraterritorial powers. Instead, these countries tend to extend the
territorial concept of criminal jurisdiction to achieve the desired result.
International law also recognizes a protective principle, allowing a state to
exercise jurisdiction over any conduct occurring outside of its territory that
threatens its security, such as counterfeiting of the state's currency.17 Further-
more, under the universality principle any state-because of the common in-
terest in all states-has jurisdiction to try certain crimes, such as piracy.18
Related to the universality principle is the passive personality principle, stating
that jurisdiction exists over aliens for criminal acts committed against nation-
als abroad. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law expressly rejects this
principle, 19 as do many states.20
15. Akehurst, supra note 8, at 153. See generally H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 14, at
854-931.
16. Akehurst, supra note 8, at 156. Some states, however, including France and Turkey,
require that the act be criminal under the lex loci, that the crimes be serious, or that prosecution
be requested by either the injured party or his government. Id See generally M. WESER, CON-
VENTION COMMUNAUTAIRE SUR LA COMPETENCE JUDICIARE ET L'EXECUTION DES DECISIONS 99-
111 (1975); Weser, Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries, 10 AM. J.
COMP. L. (1961).
17. REST. FOR REL., supra note 7, § 33:
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as a state or the operation of its
governmental functions, provided the conduct is generally recognized as a crime under
the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
(2) Conduct referred to in Subsection (1) includes in particular the counterfeiting of the
state's seals and currency, and the falsification of its official documents.
Common-law countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom usually do not exercise
such jurisdiction. Thus, within the United States it is a crime to counterfeit foreign currency, 18
U.S.C. § 482 (1976), but no American law forbids counterfeiting U.S. currency abroad. REST.
FOR. REL., supra note 7, at 93.
18. REST. FOR. REL., supra note 7, § 34. See also id., Reporter's Note, at 97:
In addition to the slave trade, traffic in women for prostitution, traffic in narcotic drugs,
and war crimes have been the subject of similar universal condemnation. However, with
the possible exception of war crimes ... universal interest in the suppression of slavery
and these other crimes has not as yet been carried to the point of recognizing, either in
customary law or in international agreements, the principle of universal jurisdiction that
obtains in the instance of piracy.
19. Id., Comment, at 88. See id. § 30(2), quoted in notes 8 & 9 supra.
20. But cf. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (a state is free to exercise jurisdic-
tion as long as there is not an established norm of international law to the contrary).
Nations that subscribe to this theory could present an argument that it would apply to fraud
of the type delineated in § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The act of fraud requires
misrepresentation with the intent to deceive. To this extent, scienter becomes a necessary element
of the crime, and the parallel to criminal law is obvious. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 921
(2d Cir. 1980).
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As is readily seen, the United States in many instances does not exercise
its jurisdictional power to the fullest extent allowed by customary interna-
tional law. The general rule in the United States is that subject matter juris-
diction can be asserted over the extraterritorial activities of a foreign person
when (1) conduct has occurred within the United States, 21 or (2) conduct has
occurred abroad that caused a substantial and foreseeable or intended effect
within the United Stats.22
Although the United States has the power to apply its laws to the extrater-
ritorial activities of foreign persons under either of these principles, the first
question before a United States court with respect to any particular statute is
whether Congress in fact intended the provisions of the statute to be applied to
the activities of foreign persons to the fullest extent allowed by international
law.23 The courts in the United States have considered the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the 1934 Act 24 primarily in actions arising under section 10(b)25
and rule lOb-5 26 of that Act, which prohibit any person from using the means
and instrumentalities of United States interstate commerce to effect fraudulent
transactions in securities. The courts generally have held that Congress in-
tended the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act to apply extraterritorially only
when there has been some conduct occurring within the United States or some
significant impact on United States investors or on the United States securities
markets. 27 A mere incidental use of the means and instrumentalities of
21. See REST. FOR. REL., supra note 7, § 17.
22. See id. §§ 18, 38. See also Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 281, 285 (1911). The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 generally supersedes these rules ofjurisdiction for forein states
and their agents or instrumentalities. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1441, 1602-1611 (1976). See New
England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Iranian assets litigation). See generally Delaume, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunites Act, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 640 (1980).
If the relevant acts of foreigners take place outside of the territory of the United States, mere
effects in the United States are insufficient to confer jurisdiction. The effects must be "substantial"
and either be intended or "occur 'as a direct and foreseeable result' of that particular conduct."
Id. at 646. See also Akehurst, supra note 8, at 155.
23. See United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). See also American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1980).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
25. Id. § 78j(b).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
27. But see Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614
F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980); East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aj'd, 592 F.2d
673 (2d Cir. 1979).
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United States commerce, however, will not support subject matter jurisdiction
over an allegedly fraudulent extraterritorial transaction.
1. Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the 1934 Act
Although subject matter jurisdiction in section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 ac-
tions depends on congressional intent, there is, unfortunately, little in the 1934
Act to guide the courts. Consequently, the courts have developed two basic
tests to determine whether jurisdiction exists. If a transaction satisfies either
an "effects" test or a "conduct" test, subject matter jurisdiction will be found.
This section will trace the development and application of these tests as they
have been applied to rule lOb-5 actions.
In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook2U plaintiffs alleged that an issue of stock in
Canada to insiders of a Canadian company at an unfairly low price adversely
affected the value and the price of the company's shares listed on the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange, some of which were held by resident U.S. citizens includ-
ing the plaintiff. In holding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over
the violations alleged to have taken place outside the United States, the Sec-
ond Circuit defined the extraterritorial reach of the 1934 Act: "We believe
that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in
order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on
American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the ef-
fects of improper foreign transactions in American securities."'29
While the Schoenbaum court found jurisdiction over an extraterritorial
transaction in foreign securities because it affected the domestic securities mar-
ket, several years later the same circuit in Investment Properties International,
Ltd v. lOS, Ltd.30 rephrased the test:
[A]lthough the behavior of a defendant, including its connection to
the United States and to the domestic securities market and ex-
changes, is relevant in deciding whether an extraterritorial transac-
tion comes within the jurisdiction of the Act, the main consideration
appears to be: does the transaction have some signtflcant impact [1] on
the domestic securities market or /2] on domestic investors[?]3 1
In Leasco Data Processing Equpment Corp. v. Maxwell 32 the Second Cir-
cuit developed a test applicable to an extraterritorial transaction in foreign
securities traded exclusively in foreign markets. In Leasco a series of alleged
misrepresentations about an English corporation were made in the United
States to officers of a publicly held U.S. corporation that was being induced to
purchase the British corporation's stock. Even though other misrepresenta-
28. 405 F.2d 200, modAed on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en band), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See generally Becker, Extraterritorial Dimensions ofthe Securities
ExchangeAct, 2 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 233 (1969).
29. 405 F.2d at 206 (emphasis added).
30. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,011 (S.D.N.Y.), a f'dmer.,
No. 71-1415 (2d Cir. 1971).
31. Id. at 90,735 (emphasis added).
32. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
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tions were made in England and the purchase of the shares was effected there,
the court concluded that "if Congress had thought about the point, it would
... have wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner comes to the
United States and fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities
abroad. .... .33
The Leasco court noted that "[w]hen no fraud has been practiced in this
country and the purchase or sale has not been made here, we would be hard
pressed to find justification for going beyond Schoenbaum.34 On the facts in
Leasco, however, the issue did not arise. Because Leasco involved both sig-
nificant conduct within the United States (misrepresentations in U.S. territory)
and a direct impact on U.S. investors, the court was not required to decide
whether one or both facts--conduct and effects-would be enough to support
subject matter jurisdiction.
In Bersch v. DrexelFirestone, Inc.35 the Second Circuit clarified the extent
to which significant domestic conduct is a necessary element for jurisdiction
when there is a direct impact on U.S. investors. Bersch was a class action
brought on behalf of persons who had purchased common stock in Investors
Overseas Services ("IOS"), a Canadian corporation, in a public offering
abroad pursuant to an allegedly misleading prospectus. The plaintiff class in-
cluded U.S. citizens who were resident both in the United States and abroad
and foreigners resident abroad. The plaintiffs alleged that IOS, with the assist-
ance of U.S. accountants and underwriters, planned the offering and partially
drafted the prospectus within the United States.
The court concluded that the activities that occurred in the United States
would not of themselves confer subject matter jurisdiction for the foreign
plaintiffs because the activities were "merely preparatory" to the actual fraud,
which was committed by placing the allegedly false prospectus in the pur-
chaser's hands.36 The court found, however, that the dispatch of misleading
statements from abroad to residents in the United States to induce them to
purchase foreign securities abroad would support jurisdiction for these resi-
dents. With respect to the U.S. citizens resident abroad, the court concluded
that "[w]hile merely preparatory activities in the United States are not enough
to trigger application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located
abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is to Americans so resident. '37
Thus, in Bersch the court formulated the most comprehensive test to date
33. Id. at 1337.
34. Id. at 1334.
35. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
36. Id. at 992. The court rejected plaintifis argument that jurisdiction could be based on the
adverse economic impact of the collapse of lOS on the domestic securities markets and on domes-
tic investors, stating:
[Tihere is subject matter jurisdiction of fraudulent acts relating to securities which are
committed abroad only when these result in injury to purchasers or sellers of those secur-
ities in whom the United States has an interest, not where acts simply have an adverse
effect on the American economy or American investors generally.
Id. at 989 (footnotes omitted).
37. Id. at 992.
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of the application of the antifraiid provisions of the 1934 Act to extraterritorial
transactions in foreign securities:
We have thus concluded that the anti-fraud provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resi-
dent in the United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to
act) of material importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resi-
dent abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of mate-
rial importance in the United States have significantly contributed
thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners
outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act)
within the United States directly caused such losses.38
In a companion case, liT v. Vencap, Ltd.,39 decided the same day as
Bersch, the Second Circuit determined, at least with respect to a U.S. defend-
ant, that perpetration of the fraudulent acts themselves within the United
States would confer jurisdiction. The court stated that it did not believe that
"Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for manu-
facturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled
only to foreigners."'' The court further emphasized, however, that jurisdic-
tion could not be based on mere preparatory activities within the United
States.
The Second Circuit, in essence, has developed criteria for finding subject
matter jurisdiction based on either conduct or effect in the United States, al-
though it did not explicitly use those labels. Under the jurisdictional test in
Bersch, a foreigner could be subject to jurisdiction under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 if any of the investment information or materials regarding foreign
securities that it transmits to U.S. citizens resident in the United States are
materially misleading even though such Americans may purchase or sell the
securities abroad relying on the information or materials. Similarly, in Des
Brisay v. Goldield Corp.41 the Ninth Circuit found jurisdiction over acts that
were substantially foreign in origin when they resulted in a direct adverse ef-
fect on domestic securities markets. An adverse effect on U.S. securities mar-
kets apparently will support jurisdiction regardless of whether the securities in
question were those of a U.S. citizen or a foreign issuer.42
A foreigner, however, would not be subject to jurisdiction under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 for merely transmitting allegedly misleading advisory
38. Id. at 993.
39. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
40. Id. at 1017. See also SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977), in which the court permitted the SEC to sue to enjoin allegedly fraudulent actions com-
mited in the United States by a U.S. and a Canadian corporation against another Canadian cor-
poration, even though the foreign corporation was the sole victim of the fraud and there were no
noticeable effects of the fraud in the United States.
41. 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
42. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (8th Cir. 1972).
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information or materials regarding foreign securities to U.S. citizens resident
abroad or to foreigners as no acts of material importance by such foreigner
occurring in the United States would have significantly contributed to any in-
jury of such persons. 43 If the advisory materials were prepared in the United
States, though, that would be sufficient to give the court subject matter juris-
diction to the extent that the materials were sent to U.S. citizens resident
abroad.44 The simple act of preparing the materials in the United States, how-
ever, seemingly would not support jurisdiction over foreigners who delivered
the materials abroad to other foreigners, the preparation of such materials be-
ig "merely preparatory" to the actual fraud, which occurred when the materi-
als were delivered abroad.
The line of cases from Schoenbaum to Bersch thus indicates two primary
concerns when a court is asked to give the federal securities laws extraterrito-
rial effect. The first, articulated by Schoenbaum, is that the fraud must have
some "effect" in the United States.4 5 The second concern focuses on the
fraudulent actions themselves. For foreign sales to U.S. citizens resident
abroad or foreigners resident abroad, the Bersch test asks whether acts of ma-
terial importance occurring in the United States contributed to, or directly
caused, the alleged losses.46
Continental Grain (Australia) Ply. Ltd v. PaciFc Oilseeds, Inc.4 7 explicitly
recognized that subject matter jurisdiction can be based purely on a conduct
test.48  In Continental Grain, an Australian corporation, Continental,
purchased stock in another Australian corporation, Pacific Seeds, Ltd., from
three vendors. The vendors were a third Australian corporation, a California
corporation, and a California resident. The vendors did not inform the pur-
chaser that a third-party supplier intended to reclaim valuable seedstock it had
sold to Pacific Seeds if the corporation were sold. The vendors used the mails
and telephone system in the United States to discuss the proposed purchase of
the corporation and the problems concerning the seedstock, and decided not to
43. One's potential exposure to an action by a U.S. resident for damages under rule lOb-5 has
been reduced significantly by the recent decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's alleged negligence
was insufficient to maintain a cause of action because rule lOb-5 required some showing of"scien-
ter"--that is, intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. But see Hacker & Rotunda, The Reliance
on CounselDefense in Securities Cases: DamageActions v. Ininctive Actions, 1 CORP. L. REV. 159
(1978).
Apart from the federal antifraud provisions, however, a negligent transmittal of allegedly
misleading advisory material to a U.S. resident by a foreigner or its agents might give rise to an
action in tort under state common law. See A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTivE 36-39
(1976). Many states also have adopted statutory law governing securities transactions that might
be applicable to such foreigners if they or their agents transmitted allegedly misleading advisory
material to persons within the state. As we discuss in the next section, a state court might be able
to exercise personal jurisdiction over such a foreigner pursuant to a state "long-arm" statute for an
alleged violation of state common law or statutory law.
44. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975).
45. 405 F.2d at 206. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
46. 519 F.2d at 993.
47. 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
48. Id. at 417.
[Vol. 59
EXTRA TERRITORIAL REGULATION
inform the purchaser of the supplier's intentions. The contract for sale was
executed in California but, apparently for tax reasons, was closed in Australia.
The court first noted that there was no measurable effect of the fraud in
the United States. The sole victim of the fraudulent nondisclosure was a for-
eign corporation, and the securities sold were not traded on any American
exchange. Therefore, the transaction had no measurable effect on the domes-
tic securities market and had, at best, only a minimal effect in the United
States.49
The Eighth Circuit, however, found the conduct occurring in the United
States sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction:
[W]e examine the relationship between defendants' conduct in the
United States and the alleged fraudulent scheme, specifically
whether defendants' conduct in the United States was significant
with respect to the alleged violation and whether it furthered the
fraudulent scheme. The conduct in the United States cannot be
"merely preparatory" and must be material, that is, "directly cause
the losses." 50
Applied to the defendants before the court, the Eighth Circuit found that let-
ters and telephone calls were necesary to further the fraudulent scheme and
constituted organization and completion of the fraud. Facilities of U.S. com-
merce were used to transmit the vendor's representatives between Australia
and California. Furthermore, two of the vendors were a U.S. corporation and
a U.S. resident.51 Even though the ultimate effect was in Australia, the court
held that the conduct in the United States was significant and constituted a
fraud completed in the United States.52 The court conceded that its finding of
subject matter jurisdiction was based on policy considerations.5 3 Congress ex-
plicitly provided that the federal securities laws should apply to foreign com-
merce to prevent the United States from becoming a base for fraudulent
securities schemes.54 In addition, such jurisdiction may encourage enforce-
ment of antifraud laws internationally as well as maintain a high standard of
conduct in securities transactions.55 These policy considerations militated in
favor of subject matter jurisdiction, even if the fraud had no effect in the
United States.
The policy of not permitting the United States to become a haven for
fraudulent securities transactions was also present in SEC v. Kasser,56 in
49. Id. at 415. Continental was owned by a U.S. corporation and, because of the accounting
system used, the loss from the transaction would be reflected on the U.S. corporation's financial
statements. The court specifically held that this effect was too remote and insubstantial to confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the court. Id. at 417.
50. Id. at 420 (citations omitted).
5 I. Id. The court held, however, that the nationality of the corporation and the individual
had "no independent significance for jurisdictional purposes." Id. at 417.
52. Id. at 420.
53. Id. at 421.
54. Id See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1976).
55. 592 F.2d at 421.
56. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
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which the Third Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction will exist if there
is conduct in the United States that directly causes the fraud. In Kasser the
sole victim of the fraud was a Canadian corporation. There was no measura-
ble effect of the fraud in the United States. The court found, however, that
conduct occurred in the United States that directly caused the victim's losses.57
"We are reluctant to conclude that Congress intended to allow the United
States to become a 'Barbary Coast,' as it were, harboring international securi-
ties pirates.' "58
These various jurisdictional principles were recently applied in lIT v.
Cornfeld.59 In Cornfeld the district court dismissed the complaint of the liqui-
dators of a Luxembourg corporation against alleged U.S. and foreign defraud-
ers and against U.S. accounting and brokerage firms that aided and abetted
the fraud by certifying false financial statements and underwriting securities
offerings with knowledge of the fraud. The court rejected the claim that sub-
ject matter jurisdiction existed just because a fraction of one percent of the
fund holders in the investment trust were Americans.60 Nor would a vague
claim of a damaged ability of the United States to attract foreign investment
support jurisdiction. 61
Turning to a "conduct" test the court determined that, although the in-
vestment trust purchased substantial amounts of U.S. securities, this was insuf-
ficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. To uphold jurisdiction on this
ground would mean that a "foreign shareholder in any foreign corporation
could bring a derivative action in this country to challenge the conduct of the
foreign directors who effected the purchases."'62 The court further character-
ized the conduct of the U.S. accounting and underwriting firms, if true, as
merely preparatory to the primary deception practiced on the fundholders.
The essence of the complaint was that foreign directors of the investment trust
looted the corporation. "Since virtually all the fundholders were foreign na-
tionals residing in foreign countries, the deception. . . must have occurred
outside of the United States."' 63 The court concluded that the application of
rule 10b-5 to the foreign directors would be a "totally unprecedented and un-
authorized expansion of the reach" of that rule.64
The Second Circuit, however, disagreed.65 Although it agreed with the
district court's conclusion that the transactions' effects within the United States
were insufficient to support subject matter jurisdiction,66 the court, neverthe-
less, found the conduct within the United States a sufficient basis for jurisdic-
57. Id. at 115.
58. Id. at 116.
59. 462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), modfled, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
60. Id. at 223 n.33.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 225. See note 86 infra.
63. 462 F. Supp. at 224 (emphasis in original).
64. Id. at 226.
65. IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
66. Id. at 917. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
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tion.67 The court disagreed with the district court's characterization of the
transactions. It found that several U.S. defendants were more intimately in-
volved in the perpetration of fraud than was determined by the district court.68
The court also placed greater emphasis on the trust's purchase of U.S. securi-
ties. It noted that "the American nationality of the issuer [and] the consum-
mation of the transaction in the United States" both "pointed strongly toward
applying the antifraud provisions of [the] securities laws."' 69 The transaction
was sufficient to support subject matter jurisdiction even though "the pur-
chaser was a foreigner and the orders were transmitted from abroad." 70 The
court rejected the idea that "foreigners engaging in security purchases in the
United States are not entitled to the protection of. . .[U.S.] securities laws."71
The court went on to find subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the
trust's purchases of debentures from a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company.72
The court viewed the debentures in substance as U.S. securities rather than as
foreign securities. 73 The court distinguished Bersch on the ground that in this
case U.S. securities were involved, a majority of the offerings occurred in the
United States, U.S. underwriters were heavily involved, and much of the work
was done in the United States.74 Thus, the court concluded that
while many of the acts in the United States. . .were similar to those
in Bersch, the relativity is entirely different because of the lack here
of the foreign activity so dominant in Bersch . . . .Determination
whether American activities "directly" caused losses to foreigners de-
pends not only on how much was done in the United States but also
on how much (here how little) was done abroad.75
Though a court may find subject matter jurisdiction under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 based either upon acts of fraud that occurred in the United
States or on a foreseeable effect in the United States of fraudulent conduct
abroad, these two tests do not confer unlimited subject matter jurisdiction on
the federal courts. The limits of subject matter jurisdiction are illustrated in
the recent case of Fidenas A G v. Compagnie Internationale Pour LInformatique
67. 619 F.2d at 917-18.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 918.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 919-21.
73. Id. at 919.
74. Id. at 919-20.
75. Id. at 920-21 (footnote omitted). The defendants also argued that the assertion of subject
matter jurisdiction would "affront" Luxembourg. Id. at 921. The court disposed of this argument
by noting:
The problem of conflict between our laws and that of a foreign government is much less
when the issue is the enforcement of the anti-fraud sections of the securities laws than
with such provisions as those requiring registration of persons or securities. The primary
interest of Luxembourg is in the righting of a wrong done to an entity created by it. If
our anti-fraud laws are stricter than Luxembourg's, that country will surely not be of-
fended by their application. If they are weaker. . . the [plaintiffs] made their choice
Id. This same theme is stressed throughout this Article.
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CII Honeywell Bull SA .76 Three foreign dealers in commercial paper brought
a section 10(b) action against other foreign corporations and individuals who
allegedly issued fraudulent promissory notes. All transactions and fraudulent
conduct occurred outside of the United States, and all the plaintiffs were for-
eign. Although some of the fraudulent notes were sold to Americans, the court
found that this would not support jurisdiction when those U.S. purchasers
were not parties to the suit.77 The plaintiffs also charged that a United States
parent corporation of one of the foreign defendants knew of the cover-up
phase of the alleged fraud. The court, however, characterized this conduct,
even if true, as at most secondary or ancillary conduct.78 The court character-
ized the actions as "predominantly foreign" and therefore found no subject
matter jurisdiction.79 Thus, Fidenas indicates the limits of a "conduct" test.
When all parties to an action are foreigners resident abroad, and there is no
measurable effect in the United States, a court must find conduct in the United
States that directly causes the l6sses before it can maintain subject matter ju-
risdiction.
2. Extraterritorial Application of Broker-Dealer Regulations
Under Section 30(b)
Apart from the jurisdictional principles developed by the courts for appli-
cation to the antifraud provisions of section 10(b), Congress specifically ad-
dressed the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 1934 Act in section 30(b), which
provides:
The provisions of this Chapter or of any rule or regulation there-
under shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business
in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he
transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to pre-
vent the evasion of this chapter.80
The SEC has not adopted any rules or regulations under section 30(b).
There are two basic conditions to the applicability of the section 30(b)
exemption: that the exempt person "transact a business in securities" and that
he do so "without the jurisdiction of the United States."
(a) Business In Securities
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Schoenbaurm v. First-
brook8 l examined the applicability of section 30(b) and found that "while sec-
tion 30(b) was intended to exempt persons conducting a business in securities
76. 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979).
77. The court declined to rule on whether jurisdiction could be maintained if a U.S. pur-
chaser brought the action. Id. at 8 n.4.
78. Id. at 8 (citing opinion of the trial court).
79. Id. at 10.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976).
81. 405 F.2d 200, modfed on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
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through foreign securities markets from the provisions of the Act, it does not
preclude extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act to persons who en-
gage in isolated foreign transactions. ' 82 The court thus made it clear that a
person must conduct a literal "business in securities" in order to come within
the section 30(b) exemption. The court reasoned that Congress enacted sec-
tion 30(b) to allow persons to conduct a business in securities outside the
United States "without complying with the burdensome reporting requirement
of the Act and without being subject to its regulatory provisions. '8 3 The ex-
emption is not available for persons engaging in isolated transactions, as for
instance nonbrokers and nondealers who make misrepresentations in violation
of section 10(b) in inducing the purchase or sale of securities. 84
The position taken by the court in Schoenbaum represents a reasonable
policy distinction designed to promote the principle of comity among nations.
Absent compelling circumstances, section 30(b) leaves the regulation of the
internal business operations of foreign securities businesses to the authorities
of the host countries, but reserves to the competence of U.S. courts adjudica-
tion of disputes over isolated events having some contact with the United
States.
The courts have interpreted the section 30(b) exemption to be "limited in
its application so as to exempt from the 1934 Act only brokers, dealers and
banks" when they transact business outside the United States. 85 Thus, the
exemption is not available to exempt from regulation under the 1934 Act the
internal business operations of other types of foreign businesses. As will be
discussed in the next section, however, the logic underlying the section 30(b)
exemption seems equally applicable to other types of foreign businesses. Prin-
ciples of international comity suggest that the internal business operations of
foreign business in general, as distinct from isolated events that impact on the
United States, should be left to the regulatory authorities of the domiciliary
nation unless regulation under United States law is essential for the protection
of legitimate United States interests. 8
6
82. 405 F.2d at 207. See also Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 526 n.21 (8th Cir.
1973).
83. 405 F.2d at 207.
84. Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The rules and regula-
tions promulgated by the SEC must provide expressly for their extraterritorial effect if § 30(b) is
not to apply, and the purpose of such rules must be to prevent evasion of the Act. H.R. RaP. No.
792, 73 dCong., 2d Sess. 23 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934). The
Commission has not promulgated any rules under § 30(b).
85. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 797, 801 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (interpreting the
phrase "business of securities").
86. See the decision of the International Court of Justice, Barcelona Traction, Light & Power
Co. [19701 I.C.J. 3. The issue before the court was whether Belgium could exercise a right of
diplomatic protection on behalf of shareholders of Belgian nationality in a corporation organized
under the laws of Canada and having its primary place of business in Spain. The court held that
Belgium did not have the capacity to assert a claim on behalf of Belgian shareholders of a Cana-
dian corporation against the Spanish Government for alleged abuse of its bankruptcy jurisdiction
and powers. The court stressed that unless Belgium had another independent and valid ground
for jurisdiction, "the general rule of international law authorizes the national state of the company
alone to make a claim." Id. 1 88. The court also expressed reservations that "competing diplo-
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(b) Without the Jurisdiction of the United States
The Ninth Circuit, in SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc.,8 7 held that
"jurisdiction" as employed in section 30(b) is not defined as "territorial lim-
its," and apparently decided that it was intended to mean subject matter juris-
diction. 88 The courts that have construed section 30(b) generally have
followed the rule that a transaction will be deemed to have occurred within the
jurisdiction of the United States only if both some necessary and substantial
element of the transaction occurred within the United States and the transac-
tion had a foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or the domestic securities mar-
kets.8 9
In Kook v. Crang,90 for example, a Canadian brokerage firm extended
credit to a United States resident in an amount allegedly in excess of that
permitted by section 7(c) of the 1934 Act. The court, however, held that the
transaction did not have sufficient contacts with the United States to defeat the
section 30(b) exemption:
All the essentials of these transactions occurred without the United
States. Stock of a Canadian corporation was purchased on the To-
ronto Exchange by a Canadian brokerage house. The orders were
placed and payment received in Canada. Credit was extended and
the stocks were held as collateral in Canada. Confirmation and all
margin calls emanated from Canada. Whatever choice of law theory
might be applied, these were Canadian transactions, and the use of
the mails and telephone within the United States does not change the
locale.9 1
Nor was the otherwise foreign transaction deprived of the exemption because
the defendant maintained an office in the United States: "Certainly, the mere
presence of defendant as a broker or dealer [registered under the 1934 Act]
would not, without more, make its foreign transactions subject to the Act. ' 92
In Roth v. Fund ofFunds, Ltd.,93 the defendant, a Canadian corporation
based in Switzerland, was held not to be entitled to the section 30(b) exemp-
tion for purchases and sales of securities of a U.S. corporation within six
months in violation of section 16(b). The Second Circuit noted that "the Fund
matic claims ... could create an atmosphere of confusion and insecurity in international eco-
nomic relations." Id. 96.
87. 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).
88. Id. at 357-58. Accord, Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,889, at 97,027 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The Second Circuit panel, in affirming
in part and reversing in part, did not reach this issue. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975).
89. See text accompanying notes 90-94 infra.
90. 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
91. Id. at 390. Similarly, in Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48
F.R.D. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court held that the commodity futures transactions in question
were within the § 30(b) exemption because they "were between foreigners, were made in France
or in Italy and were executed on the London Exchange." Id. at 386.
92. 182 F. Supp. at 391. See UFITEC, S.A. v. Carter, [1976-1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
93. 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969).
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bought and sold the securities in question on the New York Stock Exchange,
utilizing New York City stock brokers to execute its orders to buy and sell, and
made payment for the purchases through a New York bank."94 Consequently,
the court found that, as the transaction occurred within the United States and
had a direct effect on the domestic securities markets, it could not come within
the exemptive language "insofar as he transacts a business in securities with-
out the jurisdiction of the United States."
In contrast to the expanded test governing subject matter jurisdiction
under the antifraud provisions of section 10(b), which allows jurisdiction on
the basis of either pure effects or pure conduct,95 the section 30(b) test of extra-
territorial jurisdiction requires a finding of both necessary and substantial con-
duct within the United States and a foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or
securities markets. 96 The congressional purpose underlying section 30(b), as
well as principles of international comity, argue against applying the expanded
test for jurisdiction developed under section 10(b) to impose regulation under
the 1934 Act upon the internal business operations of a foreign business that is
subject to the regulatory authority of its host nation. Thus, a foreign broker-
dealer should be exempt under section 30(b) from registration under the 1934
Act and from the extensive regulation of its ongoing business operations en-
tailed by such registration, unless it conducts a necessary and substantial part
of its business within the United States and its business has a foreseeable effect
on United States persons or on the United States securities markets.
To illustrate, consider a foreign broker-dealer whose business involves the
following contacts with the United States. Our hypothetical foreign broker-
dealer maintains an arrangement with a registered U.S. broker-dealer for the
execution and clearance of transactions in U.S. securities on behalf of the for-
eign broker-dealer's customers who are foreign persons; the foreign broker-
dealer maintains custodian accounts in U.S. banks in connection with the
transactions in U.S. securities; the foreign broker-dealer provides investment
advisory materials and recommendations regarding foreign securities to U.S.
broker-dealers; members of the foreign broker-dealer travel to the United
States to discuss the U.S. broker-dealer's investment in foreign securities as a
means of soliciting brokerage business; and the foreign broker-dealer mails
information regarding specific foreign securities to U.S. investors pursuant to
their unsolicited requests for the information.
Section 15(a)(1) of the 1934 Act 97 requires that all investment bro-
94. Id. at 422. See Sinva, Inc. v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48 F.R.D. 385
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), discussed in note 91 supra. See also United States v. Weisscredit Banca Com-
mercial E D'Investimenti, 325 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re 10S, Ltd., [1971-1972 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 178,637 (SEC Administrative Proceedings, March 14, 1972).
95. See text accompanying notes 14-55 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer which is either a person other than a
natural person or a natural person not associated with a broker or dealer which is a
person other than a natural person (other than such a broker or dealer whose business is
exclusively intrastate and who does not make use of any facility of a national securities
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kers98 or dealers,99 with certain exceptions not relevant here, who "make use
of the mails or of any means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce to
effect any transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale of,. . any security
otherwise than on a national securities exchange" must register with the SEC.
Unlike an attempt to effect or induce a transaction, a mere incidental use of
the means or instrumentalities of U.S. interstate commerce in connection with
a foreign broker-dealer's conduct of a wholly extraterritorial brokerage busi-
ness would not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction under section
15(a)(1). 100 Given our hypothetical set of facts the question is whether the
foreign broker-dealer's additional contacts with the United States represent its
engagement in the "business" of a broker-dealer within the jurisdiction of the
United States so that the section 30(b) exemption is unavailable and the regis-
tration requirements of section 15(a)(1) are applicable. Under a jurisdictional
test that would require both essential conduct within the United States and a
foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or U.S. securities markets, none of the ac-
tivities of this hypothetical foreign broker-dealer should result in a finding of
subject matter jurisdiction under section 15(a)(1).
(i) Providing Investment Advisory Materials and Advice to
U.S. Broker-Dealers
The solicitation of securities business has been viewed as an essential ele-
ment of conducting business as a broker-dealer. 10 1 A foreign broker-dealer
that provides investment advisory materials and advice regarding foreign se-
curities to American broker-dealers obviously does so as a means of soliciting
brokerage business in foreign securities. Thus, it might be argued that the
foreign broker-dealer's conduct of business within the United States, standing
alone, should be sufficient under a pure conduct test to assert subject matter
jurisdiction and require registration under section 15(a)(1).
This conclusion may well be the wrong result because the foreign broker-
dealer's conduct in providing materials and advice to U.S. broker-dealers
would not have a foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or on the U.S. securities
exchange) to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce to effect any transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale
of, any security (other than an exempted security or commercial paper, bankers' accept-
ances, or commercial bills) unless such broker or dealer is registered in accordance with
subsection (b) of this section.
98. A broker is defined in § 3(a)(4) of the 1934 Act to include "any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others. ... Id. § 78c(a)(4).
99. A dealer is defined in § 3(a)(5) of the 1934 Act as any person who, in the regular course of
business, purchases and sells securities for his own account. Id. § 78c(a)(5).
100. The court in SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1973),
suggested that a mere incidental use of the means and instrumentalities of U.S. interstate com-
merce, without more, was an insufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction under the antifraud
provisions.
101. See In re F.W. Home & Co., 38 S.E.C. 104, 108 (1957); see also SEC v. Myers, 285 F.
Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1968) (case brought under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §§ 201-221, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to -21 (1976), in which the court held that solicitation of clients, whether or not
successful, is an integral part of the business of an investment adviser).
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markets. The SEC staff, in two "no-action" letters,' 0 2 has taken the position
that investment advice transmitted from abroad to U.S. public investors con-
stitutes a use of the means and instrumentalities of U.S. interstate com-
merce' 0 3 "to induce" the purchase or sale of a security within the meaning of
section 15(a)(1). Therefore, under the SEC position a foreign broker-dealer
that transmits such investment advice must register under section 15(b), 104
pursuant to the registration requirements of section 15(a)(1). The transmittal
of such advisory materials and advice to U.S. broker-dealers, however, con-
templates that the U.S. broker-dealers will use the materials and advice to
solicit brokerage business from their U.S. customers. Because the solicitation
of brokerage business from the public by U.S. broker-dealers is already sub-
ject to regulation by U.S. law,105 the transmittal of advisory materials and
advice by a foreign broker-dealer to U.S. broker-dealers, standing alone,
should not be viewed as having a foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or on the
U.S. securities markets. Any effect on protected U.S. interests would arise
only from the U.S. broker-dealers transmitting the materials and advice to
U.S. investors, conduct that is clearly subject to regulation under U.S. law.
Without some clear effect on protected U.S. interests, there seems to be little
reason to subject the internal business operations of a foreign broker-dealer
already regulated by the domiciliary nation to overlapping and possibly con-
fficting regulation under U.S. law.
(ii) Unsolicited Requests for Advice Regarding Foreign Securities
From U.S. Persons
As mentioned above, a foreign broker-dealer may be subject to registra-
tion pursuant to section 15(a)(1) if it sends advisory materials regarding spe-
cific foreign securities to investors resident in the United States. In a "no-
action" letter to Hoare & Govett, Ltd., 106 the SEC staff stated that such advice
to U.S. investors will trigger the registration requirements notwithstanding the
generality of the advice. The staff warned:
102. SEC "No-Action" Letters to Hoare & Co. Govett, Ltd. (avail. Oct. 28, 1973) and to
Wood, Mackenzie & Co. (avail. Sept. 23, 1974). A "no-action" letter is informal, interpretative
legal advice by the SEC staff in which it indicates that, on the basis of certain facts stated in a
letter or other communication, "the staff would not recommend that the Commission take any
enforcement action." 17 C.F.R. § 200.81(a) (1980). The procedure to receive no action and inter-
pretative letters is outlined in 36 Fed. Reg. 2600 (1971). A "no-action" letter does not operate to
bind third parties. See 27 Fed. Reg. 1316, 1317 (1962). The SEC also has argued that a "no-
action" letter does not even bar the Commission staff from later instituting an enforcement action
against the recipient of a "no-action" letter. Brief for SEC, Abbett, Sommer & Co. v. SEC, [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,813 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971), citedin 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcurriES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 1.11, at 1-
50.3 (1976); Hacker & Rotunda, The SEC's Ectoplasmic Theory of an Issuer as Applied to Educa-
tional and Charitable Institutions, Bank Trustees, and Other Exempt Issuers, 65 CAL. L. REv. 1181,
1202 n.106 (1977).
103. The term "interstate commerce" is defined in § 3(a)(17) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17)
(1976), to include "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication. . . between any foreign
country and any State .
104. Id. § 78o(b).
105. Id. § 78o(a)(1) & (2).
106. SEC "No-Action Letter" to Hoare & Govett, Ltd. (avail. Oct. 28, 1973).
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The fact that the nature of the advice or solicitation is general-that
is, that Hoare would not recommend specific securities, but might
only mention the name of a foreign broker or dealer and indicate
that foreign securities may be purchased through that foreign firm-
does not appear to suggest a different result. 10 7
The SEC staff letter suggested that the publishing of generalized informa-
tion in the United States about a foreign broker-dealer and the sending of
advice regarding specific foreign securities to U.S. investors upon their unso-
licited request for the information might subject a foreign broker-dealer to the
registration provisions of section 15(a)(1). This suggestion of the staff seems to
rely on a pure conduct test for jurisdiction. By contrast, if the proper jurisdic-
tional test for provisions such as section 15(a)(l)-provisions that impose reg-
ulations on internal business operations rather than provisions like section
10(b) relating to the prevention of fraud-requires both conduct within the
United States and a foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or securities markets,
then section 30(b) should exempt from registration under section 15(a)(1) a
foreign broker-dealer who does no more than publish generalized information
about itself in the United States and send advisory information about specific
foreign securities to U.S. persons pursuant to their unsolicited request for the
information. The foreign broker-dealer's conduct does not appear to have a
sufficient effect on protected U.S. interests. A U.S. person who encounters
generalized information about a foreign broker-dealer and who, on his or her
own initiative, requests from the foreign broker-dealer advisory information
about specific foreign securities has no reason to believe that the foreign bro-
ker-dealer is engaged in business in the United States and is thereby subject to
regulation under U.S. law. By acting on his or her own initiative to solicit
specific recommendations from a foreign broker-dealer, a U.S. person assumes
the risk that the business affairs of the broker-dealer will be governed by for-
eign law. There should be no reason, therefore, for the United States to seek
to interfere with a foreign sovereign's regulation of the internal business of its
domiciliary company to protect any legitimate U.S. interests.108
(iii) The Maintenance of Clearing Arrangements With
U.S. Broker-Dealers
A foreign broker-dealer should not become subject to jurisdiction under
section 15(a)(1) just because it maintains certain custodian accounts with U.S.
banks in connection with transactions in U.S. securities effected for its foreign
customers through U.S. broker-dealers. These transactions have no significant
impact on U.S. investors because they are effected solely on behalf of the for-
eign customers. Nor is there a significant impact on U.S. securities markets
from the transactions as they are effected on the U.S. markets solely through
regulated U.S. broker-dealers.
107. Id.
108. See note 86 supra.
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The SEC staff in one "no-action" letter 10 9 appeared to confirm this view,
at least with respect to the foreign customers of the foreign broker-dealer. In
the letter the staff agreed to take "no-action" to require registration of Sun
Hung Kai Securities, Ltd. ("SHK"), a foreign broker-dealer, if SHK used Bear
Steams, a registered U.S. broker-dealer firm, to execute and clear transactions
in U.S. securities for SHK's customers on a fully disclosed basis and if SHK
maintained custodian accounts in U.S. banks in connection with the transac-
tions. The staff emphasized, however, that Bear Steams would not open any
accounts for any SHK customers who were indicated to be U.S. residents or
U.S. citizens abroad. This restriction is reasonable because a foreign broker-
dealer's maintenance of accounts of U.S. persons for the purpose of effecting
transactions in U.S. securities on U.S. markets through clearance arrange-
ments with a U.S. broker would appear to have a sufficient effect on protected
U.S. interests to justify regulation under U.S. law.
3. Extraterritorial Application of Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act
The tests developed by the courts for the extraterritorial application of the
antifraud provisions of section 10(b) should not apply equally to all of the
other provisions of the 1934 Act. The question of the extraterritorial applica-
tion of any particular provision of the Act is basically one of congressional
intent." 0 In adopting section 30(b) of the 1934 Act, Congress appears to have
drawn a distinction between isolated events, such as misrepresentations by a
foreign person, to which the U.S. antifraud provisions would apply, and U.S.
regulation of the internal business operations of a foreign business that is sub-
ject to the regulatory jurisdiction of its host nation.' In the latter case, prin-
ciples of international comity argue that U.S. law should avoid interfering in a
foreign nation's regulation of the internal affairs of its domiciliary business
organizations, unless there is a clear need to impose U.S. regulation in order to
protect legitimate U.S. interests. 12 Under section 30(b) the courts, when deal-
ing with regulations under the 1934 Act that would apply to the internal busi-
ness operations of a foreign broker-dealer, have applied a jurisdictional test
that requires both essential conduct within the United States and a foreseeable
effect on U.S. persons or on the U.S. securities markets." 3 Although section
30(b) applies only to broker-dealers and banks,' 14 the jurisdictional test devel-
oped under section 30(b) also reflects Congress' intent regarding the extraterri-
torial application of those provisions under the 1934 Act that would regulate
the internal operations of foreign businesses, as distinct from provisions such
as section 10(b), which would apply to isolated misrepresentations by a foreign
person that had some contact with the United States.
109. SEC "No-Action Letter" to Bear, Stearns & Co. (avail. Feb. 6, 1976).
110. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206, modofied on other grounds, 405 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied. 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
111. Id. at 207.
112. See note 86 supra.
113. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
114. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
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Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 when applied extraterritorially, imposes
U.S. regulation on the internal affairs of a foreign business. Section 16(b) was
enacted to discourage the unfair use of information in short-term trading by
beneficial owners of more than ten percent of a class of equity security regis-
tered pursuant to section 12 of the 1934 Act" 6 and by officers and directors of
the issuer of such a security ("statutory insiders"). The section provides that
profits realized by statutory insiders from the purchase and sale, or sale and
purchase, of any equity security of the issuer, within a period of less than six
months, inure to, and are recoverable by, and on behalf of, the issuer. The
section applies automtically to any short-swing transactions, regardless of
whether the insider in fact used inside information when effecting the transac-
tions."17
Section 16(b) imposes automatic liability on the insider regardless of ac-
tual injury because the section is designed to assure outside investors who may
wish to trade in the securities that "insiders" of the issuer who may have access
to information regarding the issuer's short-term prospects will not have an ad-
vantage when trading in the market. In contrast to the antifraud provisions of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, "18 it is not the purpose of section 16(b) to impose
liability for damages suffered by the plaintiff-issuer or its outside stockholders
resulting from an insider's unfair use of inside information. Nor is it the pur-
pose of section 16(b) to impose liability for any unfair adverse effect on the
market price of an issuer's securities resulting from the insider's short-swing
transactions. Rather, when applied extraterritorially section 16(b) imposes
regulation on the internal affairs of foreign companies that seek access to the
U.S. securities markets by imposing absolute liability on their officers, direc-
tors, and principal stockholders for short-swing profits regardless of fault. "19
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976):
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been ob-
tained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the
issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase,
of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period
of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irre-
spective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in
entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be
instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by
the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer
shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently
to prosecute the same thereafter, but no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction
or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not com-
prehended within the purpose of this subsection.
116. Id. § 781. See Hacker & Rotunda, Short-Swing Profits, Section 16(b), and Nonstauto.ry
Insiders, 3 CoRP. L. REv. 252 (1980).
117. Cf Hazen, The New Pragmatism under Section 16(b) ofthe Securities Exchange ,Al, 54
N.C.L. REv. 1 (1975) (discussing the pragmatic trend away from an objective application of
§ 16(b)).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
119. See Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic ofIe Law, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 720.
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Section 16(b) applies only to the officers, directors, and principal stock-
holders of any issuer that registers a class of its equity securities under section
12 of the 1934 Act. When such an issuer is a foreign company subject to regu-
lation by its host nation, however, Congress arguably would not intend to im-
pose regulation pursuant to section 16(b) unless the short-swing transactions
by the insiders of the foreign company would have a foreseeable effect on U.S.
persons or on the U.S. securities markets. This conclusion seems particularly
true because a number of foreign countries have considered, and rejected, im-
posing regulations similar to section 16(b) on their domiciliary companies.' 20
In Wagman v. Astle12 1 the lack of any foreseeable effect on protected U.S.
interests led the court, in an action arising under section 16(b), to find it lacked
personal jurisdiction over the insiders of a foreign corporation. Wagman in-
volved an action to recover short-swing profits realized by three Canadians
(officers of a Canadian corporation), who were trading in equity securities of
the corporation on Canadian exchanges and in private sales in Canada. The
Canadian corporation was listed on the American Stock Exchange and regis-
tered pursuant to section 12 of the 1934 Act. Defendants filed ownership re-
ports with the SEC, as required by section 16(a), which stated defendants'
changes in beneficial ownership of the securities. Defendants, however, did
not do business in the United States, nor did they do any acts in the United
States connected with effecting the transactions giving rise to the cause of ac-
tion. Hence, jurisdiction over defendants could only be invoked if defendant's
acts in Canada caused effects in the United States sufficient to make the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction reasonable. Because the purpose of section 16(b) was
not to impose liability for actual damage suffered by a private plaintiff as a
result of short-swing transactions nor to protect investors from any adverse
effects of such short-swing transactions on the price of securities trading in the
market, the court concluded that the short-swing transactions effected by the
Canadians in Canada did not have sufficient impact on any protected U.S.
interests to sustain personal jurisdiction over defendants.
While the court in Wagman did not have to reach the question of subject
matter jurisdiction, our analysis suggests that subject matter jurisdiction under
section 16(b) similarly was not meant to extend to the short-swing transactions
involved in Wagman because the transactions had no foreseeable effect on
either specific U.S. persons or on the U.S. securities markets. The short-swing
transactions had no foreseeable effect on any specific U.S. persons because
only the foreign corporation, or its shareholders derivatively, could seek recov-
ery under section 16(b). Even if a U.S. person were a shareholder of the for-
eign corporation, the purpose of section 16(b) is not to impose liability for any
damage done to that shareholder. Rather, section 16(b) imposes absolute lia-
bility on corporate insiders regardless of fault in order to promote investor
confidence in the integrity of the securities markets.
120. Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934- An Alternative to "Burning
Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69, 70-71 (1966).
121. 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
1981]
NORTH CAROLINA L,4W REVIEW[
The foreign transactions in Wagman likewise had no foreseeable impact
on the U.S. securities markets. Assuming that securities are traded both
abroad and on a U.S. exchange, one might argue that there is an indirect effect
on U.S. securities markets from short-swing transactions effected abroad be-
cause U.S. investors might have less confidence in the U.S. market for a for-
eign corporation's securities if they feel that an insider of the corporation
could have an advantage over them by trading in the corporation's securities
abroad. In Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd.122 such an effect was held sufficient to
sustain jurisdiction under section 16(b) when short-swing transactions were
carried out by foreigners on the U.S. securities markets. 123 When the transac-
tions are carried out by foreigners abroad, however, the cases arising under
section 10(b) suggest that the necessary impact on the U.S. markets must be far
more direct, resulting in a foreseeable "diminution in the value" or price of the
security traded in the U.S. securities market. 124 At best, any arguably adverse
effect on investor confidence in the U.S. markets for a foreign corporation's
securities, resulting from a foreign statutory insider's short-swing transactions
effected abroad, would involve only the type of broad effect on the U.S. econ-
omy or U.S. investors in general that Bersch held to be insufficient to support
subject matter jurisdiction over substantially extraterritorial transactions. 12S
B. Jurisdiction Over the Person
1. Service Outside the United States
As Wagman 126 illustrates, apart from subject matter jurisdiction under
the 1934 Act, a federal court must also have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Due process limits a court's power to exercise jurisdiction over a
corporate or individual defendant to those cases in which the defendant has at
least "minimum contacts"127 with the forum state. The minimum contacts test
ensures that "the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.' "128 Factors weighed in determining if the
defendant has the minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction in-
clude the quantity and quality of any business done in the state by the defend-
ant, whether the contacts the defendant has have been initiated by the
defendant, 2 9 and the foreseeability that an act performed by the defendant
122. 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969). See Note,
Jurisdiction--Extra-Territorial,4pplication f United States Securities Laws, 10 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 150 (1971).
123. 405 F.2d at 422. See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
124. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 528 (8th Cir. 1973); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09, modofedon other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
125. See Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 136 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977); text accompany-
ing notes 35-38 supra.
126. 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
127. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
128. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). See also World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v.Voodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir,
1980).
129. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (jurisdiction denied because defendant's
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outside the state will have repercussions within the state.' 30 If a court seeks to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant for an act not arising out of
defendant's contacts with the state the defendant's contacts with the forum
must be "sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to permit" the state to
force the defendant to litigate the claim in the forum. 131
Section 27 of the 1934 Act authorizes the court to assert personal jurisdic-
tion to enforce any liability under the Act by service of process "wherever the
defendant may be found." In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell' 32 the Second Circuit held that Congress intended application of sec-
tion 27 to be limited only by the constraints of due process. 133 Thus, extrater-
ritorial service of process may be had whenever the defendant has the requisite
contacts with the state.134
The court in Wagman 135 suggested that a court is less restrained in exer-
cising personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant than it is in claiming sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 136 The court apparently concluded that Congress had
placed restrictions upon subject matter jurisdiction in addition to those im-
posed by due process, whereas personal jurisdiction only faces constitutional
limitations. For example, when dealing with U.S. regulation of the internal
affairs of a foreign business Congress probably did not intend to extend sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to the limits of due process.
In determining if a foreign defendant possesses the minimum contacts
with the state necessary to subject it to personal jurisdiction it is important to
distinguish between jurisdiction over acts arising out of defendant's contacts
with the state, and jurisdiction over defendant for a suit unrelated to defend-
ant's activities within the state. In the first situation personal jurisdiction will
be supported by a single act by defendant within the forum state. For exam-
ple, if there has been a rule lOb-5137 violation by a foreign person in the
United States, there will be both subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction
over the defendant for that fraud. A U.S. court is able, then, to assert personal
jurisdiction over the hypothetical foreign broker-dealer, discussed earlier in
this Article, 138 based solely on its conduct within the United States. By con-
trast Congress, arguably, did not intend U.S. broker-dealer regulations to ap-
ply to such conduct by a foreign broker-dealer. Therefore, although a court
contacts with forum state were due to decedent moving to that state after becoming defendant's
customer). See also Kulko v. Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
130. Foreseeability alone is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067 (Supp. 1980).
131. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
132. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
133. Id. at 1340.
134. See also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modi-
fied, 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
135. 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
136. Id. at 501-02.
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
138. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
1981]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
might assert personal jurisdiction over such a foreign broker-dealer, the court
probably would not have subject matter jurisdiction over the conduct.
If jurisdiction is sought to adjudicate a defendant's liability for an act not
arising out of any contacts defendant has with the forum state, however, the
contacts must be substantial. In determining if defendant's contacts are sub-
stantial enough to make it reasonable to extend jurisdiction in this situation
courts appear to consider two factors: the nature and quality of the activities
in the forum state and the dollar volume of business done there.' 39 When
these factors establish that defendant's business within the state forms an "in-
tegral part of . .[its] over-all operation," personal jurisdiction will be sus-
tained.140
Finally, personal jurisdiction arises when acts outside the state have an
effect within the state.'14 This basis for jurisdiction will apply when the effect
in the United States involves either an adverse impact on identifiable U.S.
investors, 142 or on the U.S. securities markets.' 43 The Second Circuit, how-
ever, has held that this basis for asserting personal jurisdiction must be applied
with caution in an international context, and that at a minimum the effect
within the state must occur "as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct
outside the territory."' 144
Wagman v. Astle 145 is the leading case considering the application of this
basis for jurisdiction in the context of an action to recover section 16(b) short-
swing profits for transactions effected by foreign defendants abroad. In Wag-
man the effect in the United States of such transactions was held to be too
remote to sustain personal jurisdiction.' 46 The Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 14 7 has further clarified the
degree to which conduct occurring outside the forum state must have a direct
impact on the forum in order to sustain personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court held that Oklahoma could
not constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a New York retail auto-
mobile dealer merely because it was foreseeable that a New York resident and
purchaser may move to or drive through another state. The court found that
foreseeability alone is not enough. Consistent with due process, the forum
state can only assert personal jurisdiction if the corporation's delivery of its
product to the foreign state "is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises
139. E.g., Walsh v. National Seating Co., 411 F. Supp. 564, 573 (D.,Mass. 1976).
140. Stockwell v. Page Aircraft Maintenance, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 102, 105 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
141. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971).
142. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 460-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 519
F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
143. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 529 (8th Cir. 1973).
144. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972)
(quoting REST. FOR REL., supra note 7, § 18).
145. 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
146. Id. at 499.
147. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). See also Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980); Green
v. Advance Ross Elecs. Corp., 87 Ill. App. 3d 279, 408 N.E.2d 1007 (1980). See generally Louis,
The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds its Reach: A Comment on World- Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savehuk, 58 N.C.L. REV. 407 (1980).
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from the efforts of the manufaturer or distributor to serve, directly or indi-
rectly, the market for its product" in the forum state.14 8 The forum state can-
not assert personal jurisdiction unless the corporation delivers its product
"with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State." 149
2. Service Within the United States
Service of process on an individual officer of a foreign company who is
visiting the United States would not constitute valid service on the foreign
corporation unless the individual were the company's designated agent for
service of process in the United States. 150 Assuming that the officer is not the
company's agent for service of process, service on that officer would be suffi-
cient to subject the foreign corporation to suit only if it is "doing business" in
the United States such that a court may assert personal jurisdiction over it.151
In such a case, however, a U.S. court presumably would uphold direct extra-
territorial service of process on the foreign corporation. 152
Even if the foreign officer is a designated agent for service of process, it is
unclear whether a brief visit in the United States would of itself constitute a
sufficient basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over either the corpo-
ration or the corporate official. In the past some courts have upheld assertions
of in personam jurisdiction based solely on the transient presence of a defend-
ant within the state. For instance, in Grace v. MacArthur,153 the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas upheld an assertion of in
personam jurisdiction based on defendant's presence in the airspace over the
state at the time of service of process.' 54 Grace and other similar cases, how-
ever, can no longer be considered to be valid precedent for the assertion of
jurisdiction based merely on presence within the state in light of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.'5 5 The Shaffer Court held that
all assertions of jurisdiction must meet the International Shoe standard. 5 6
The prime factor in determining whether to allow the assertion of jurisdiction
148. 444 U.S. at 297.
149. Id. at 298.
150. Eg., Vogel v. Tenneco Oil Co., 276 F. Supp. 1008, 1012 (D.D.C. 1967).
151. E.g., S.M. Stein Enterprises v. Irish Int'l Airlines, 236 F. Supp. 71, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
152. See text accompanying notes 137-40 supra.
153. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
154. Id. at 448.
155. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). For an excellent analysis of Shaffer and its implications, see Hay,
The Interrelation of Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law in United States Conflicts Law, 28 INT'L &
COMp. L.Q. 161 (1979).
156. 433 U.S. at 212. The Court spoke in the context of a state court's exercise of jurisdiction.
The same test, however, should apply to a federal court's assertion of in personam jurisdiction
over foreigners. The relationship of the United States to noncitizens outside of its territory is
analogous to the relationship of the individual states to nonresidents of the state seeking to assert
jurisdiction. If a state's assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a nonresident violates the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the federal court's assertion of extraterritorial juris-
diction over a noncitizen should also violate the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court has long
interpreted the due process restraint of both clauses identically. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19, 383 (1978).
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is not the presence of the defendant within the state, but rather "the relation-
ship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."'157 The Court re-
jected "mechanical or quantitative evaluations of the defendant's activities in
the forum" and looked to "the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws."' 58
Although Shaffer dealt with an attempted assertion of quasi in rem juris-
diction, its requirement that all assertions ofjurisdiction meet the International
Shoe standard makes its rationale applicable to any attempt to assert jurisdic-
tion. In the context of an attempt to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign
corporate official or his corporation solely on the basis of his fortuitous pres-
ence within the United States, it would seem that the International Shoe stan-
dard of "fair play and substantial justice" would seldom be met. The
fortuitous presence of the corporate officer in the United States because of, for
example, an airline stopover at a U.S. airport does not affect the relationship
between the defendant foreign corporation, the forum, and the litigation.
Therefore, service on an agent making a transient appearance in the United
States that is unrelated to the cause of action should not result in personal
jurisdiction over a foreign business entity when, in the absence of the agent's
fortuitous presence, due process strictures would prohibit the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction.
Similarly, although foreigners and foreign corporations frequently own
property in the United States, it does not appear that quasi in rem jurisdiction
should be asserted by a U.S. court to attach such property if the cause of ac-
tion is unrelated to the property.' 59 Under the Shaffer rationale, whenever it
would appear unlikely that a court could sustain personal jurisdiction over a
foreign officer or his corporation, it would be equally unlikely that a court
could seek to attach the corporation's property located in the United States.' 60
III. CONCLUSION
In seeking to determine the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws, a
foreigner finds few guideposts. The SEC has virtually abdicated its rule-mak-
ing power under the 1934 Act,' 6 ' and Congress has shown no interest in mov-
ing into the vacuum.' 62 The small number of cases in this area have focused
157. 433 U.S. at 204.
158. Id.
159. But see Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Louis, supra note
147, at 420 n.97.
160. If process were served on a foreign individual while he was in the United States so as to
validly support personal jurisdiction over him, a U.S. court could then seek to attach that individ-
ual's assets in tle United States in satisfaction of any personal liability imposed upon him.
It should be noted that the Shaffer Court left open the question whether the presence of
defendant's property in a state would be sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is
available to the plaintiff. 433 U.S. at 211 n.37.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976). See Loss, supra note 1, at 307.
162. The proposed FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (A.L.I., Proposed Official Draft, Mar. 15,
1978), however, has a section dealing with the problem. See id. § 1905. See also Loss, supra note
1. Conress has not enacted the proposed Code. As described by Professor Loss, the reporter for
this project, "the draft does not attempt to anticipate more than the more common and repetitive
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on the reach of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.163 We have
argued that the long arm of U.S. jurisdiction in the antifraud area should not
be used to support by way of analogy a similar reach for those portions of our
securities laws that are aimed at regulating the internal affairs of corporations.
As a matter of policy, Congress should not be deemed to have intended to
extend subject matter jurisdiction in these areas unless not only essential acts
are performed within the United States but also such conduct leads to a sub-
stantial and foreseeable or intended impact on protected U.S. interests.1'6
Foreign corporations should not be subjected to our intricate securities
rules, possibly conflicting with the law of the corporation's own domicile, un-
less important U.S. interests are at stake. A comparison of Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Oil Co. 165 with Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.I 66 well illustrates this
factual configurations. It thus allows ample room-particularly in ascertaining 'the limits of inter-
national law'-for what Thurman Arnold used to call 'the sporting theory ofjustice.'" Id. at 308.
A study of the proposed § 1905 is beyond the scope of this Article. Compare Karmel, Applica-
lion 0/the Federal Securities Code, 7 CONN. L. REv. 669 (1975), with Curtis, The Extraterritorial
Application of the Federal Securities Code: A Further Analysis, 9 CONN. L. REv. 67 (1976).
163. See generally B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 1, at 426-31.
164. The exercise of self-restraint by U.S. courts in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction will
also enhance the chances that foreign courts will recognize our judgments in those cases in which
we do assert it. For example, such jurisdictional self-restraint may help avoid a situation such as
the one that currently exists in the antitrust area. See generally Rosenthal & Flowe, supra note 8.
The efforts by the United States over the years to extend the extraterritorial reach of its antitrust
laws-see, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963]
Trade Cas. -70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modfed, [1965] Trade Cas. 1 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); com-
pare United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), decree
entered, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), with British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical
Indus., Ltd., [1952] 2 All. E.R. 780 (Ct. App.), [1954] 3 All. E.R. 88 (Ch.)-has lead to countermea-
sures by other countries. See, e.g., Owles, The Protection of Trading Interests Bill, [19801 4
LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 55 (discussing the British Protection of Trading Interests Bill). This
bill's full title is "A Bill to provide protection from requirements, prohibitions and judgments
imposed or given under the laws of countries outside the United Kingdom and affecting the trad-
ing or other interests of persons in the United Kingdom." Id. at 56.
The British bill was in response to the decision of Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom
Ltd. (In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation), 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), which upheld the exer-
cise of subject matter jurisdiction in an antitrust action against various foreign and domestic ura-
nium producers.
Australia and other countries are also considering similar retaliatory action:
Australia is preparing legislation along the line of the UK Protection of Trading
Interests Act.
The Australian government is considering legislation which would enable it to seize
the Australian assets of theTU.S.-based Westinghouse Electric .... Such an action
would be in retaliation for seizure of assets owned by Australian companies within the
U.S.A., should Westinghouse win its $1,000 million action against 29 U.S. and foreign
uranium producers,. for allegedly operating a cartel outside the U.S.A. between 1973
and 1975.
The Australian legislative move follows the adoption of measures banning the rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in antitrust proceedings. These were
enacted in Australia in March 1979 at about the same time that the Protection of Trading
Interests Act was passed by Parliament in the U.K. Similar legislation was proposed by
the Canadian government in July 1979, and is likely to be approved by its parliament
later this year. The law will replace temporary statutory measures adopted to protect
Canadian enterprises against demands for evidence in the Westinghouse uranium case.
New Zealand passed similar measures in July 1979, and the 41 member states of the
British Commonwealth were invited to adopt protective legislation in May, 1979.
Financial Times, European Law Letter 7 (Sept. 1980).
165. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
166. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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latter point.
In Bremen the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a provision in an
international towage contract that provided that any dispute arising out of the
contract would be heard before the London Court of Justice. The contract
also contained two clauses purporting to exculpate the petitioner from liability
for damages to the towed barges. The respondent brought suit in admiralty in
the U.S. courts alleging negligent towage and breach of contract. The lower
courts found the forum selection clause unenforceable, treating it as against
public policy because it was an agreement in advance of a controversy for the
purpose of ousting the jurisdiction of the courts. The Supreme Court dis-
agreed, even though it conceded that forum-selection clauses are traditionally
disfavored by U.S. courts. The Court reasoned that the
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be en-
couraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a paro-
chial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and
in our courts. . . . We cannot have trade and commerce in world
markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed
by our laws, and resolved in our courts.' 67
The Court went on to hold the forum selection clause valid even though the
English courts would likely enforce the exculpatory clauses and the U.S.
courts might find such a clause to be against public policy.
Bremen involved a contract provision negotiated by fully competent and
sophisticated businessmen in an arms length transaction. The effect of this
agreement was that one party gave up the preexisting right to turn to the juris-
diction of U.S. courts and accepted the exculpatory clauses. Any public policy
against forum-selection or exculpatory clauses is primarily for the benefit of
the parties, who in turn ought to be able to waive this protection in circum-
stances such as those in Bremen. It is, however, a different matter if parties
can contract out of a regulatory law, like rule lOb-5, because the purpose of
that rule is to protect investors in general, not merely the parties. Yet in
Scherk the Court allowed this more far-reaching escape of the reach of U.S.
law. In Scherk, the Court enforced an arbitration clause in an international
sales contract between a U.S. corporation and a German citizen. The agree-
ment provided that arbitration would be before the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris and that Illinois law should govern. The district court,
nonetheless, sought to exercise jurisdiction claiming that Scherk's fraudulent
representations concerning certain trademark rights violated section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5. The lower court relied on section 14 of the 1933 Act, which pro-
hibits "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring
any security to waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter .... ,,168
Relying on section 14, the Supreme Court had previously declined to en-
167. 407 U.S. at 9.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976).
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force such arbitration clauses, finding them against public policy. 169 The
Court in Scherk, nevertheless distinguished these earlier cases because the
sales contract involved in Scherk "was a truly international agreement."' 170
Unlike a case in which it is clear that U.S. law applies, the international char-
acter of the contract created uncertainty over the applicable law. It was be-
cause of this uncertainty that the parties bargained for and stipulated to the
applicability of Illinois law, with any controversies or claims arising out of the
agreement to be referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris. Given the importance of international commerce and
trade, the U.S. courts should respect such arbitration clauses:
[U]ncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any
contract touching two or more countries, each with its own substan-
tive laws and conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision specify-
ing in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the
law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition
to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any
international business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision
obviates any danger that a dispute under the agreement might be
submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or
unfamiliar with the problem area involved.
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an
international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these
purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jock-
eying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. 171
If, in some circumstances, the importance of foreign trade is sufficient to
counteract the policies behind section 14 of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, then, a fortiori, foreign corporations should not be subjected to
intricate U.S. securities rules regulating the internal affairs of corporations un-
less important U.S. interests are at stake. The difficulty of securing valid per-
sonal jurisdiction in such circumstances underscores this conclusion, for it is
unlikely that Congress would have engaged in a fruitless exercise of attempt-
ing to assert subject matter jurisdiction in cases in which it is very likely that
no valid personal jurisdiction could be obtained. 172
169. E.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). Because of the provisions of § 14 of the 1933
Act, the Wilko Court refused to recognize the applicability of the United States Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1976), which had placed arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts.
The Scherk Court, however, found the Arbitration Act applicable, distinguishing Wilko because
the international contract in Scher.k was not constrained by § 14. 417 U.S. at 514-20. See text
accompanying note 171 infra.
170. 417 U.S. at 515.
171. Id. at 516-17.
172. The difficulty of securing proper venue in 1934 Act cases in many situations outside of
the antifraud provisions also supports this conclusion.
Under § 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), venue may be laid in any district where
the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, transacts business, or where any act or transaction consti-
tuting the violation or the liability-creating action occurred. The Second Circuit has held, for
example, that venue in an action under § 16(b) is proper in the district where the securities ex-
change is located, although the order to buy or sell may have been given elsewhere, if the purchase
and the sale giving rise to liability were executed on the exchange. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d
46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). Moreover, venue is present for the entire § 16(b)
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claim if any of the transactions giving rise to liability occurred within the district even though not
all of them did. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954). Thus, if any short-swing transactions were executed in the United States, venue would lie
for the entire § 16(b) claim in any district where the transactions were executed. On the other
hand, if none of the transactions were executed in the United States or otherwise involved any
contact with the United States, venue would be appropriately set only where the defendant is
found or transacts business. If the foreign corporation maintains no employees or agents in the
United States, it would not be found in the United States even though it may have property there.
United Indus. Corp. v. Nuclear Corp., 237 F. Supp. 971, 976 (D. Del. 1964). An individual travel-
ing in the United States might, of course, be "found" for both venue and service of process pur-
poses.
To determine where a corporation "transacts business," it has been held that "[t]he quantum
of business which must be transacted in a district to permit the laying of venue therein is less than
the 'doing business' necessary to warrant a finding that the defendant is present or is to be found,
in the district for jurisdictional purposes." SEC v. Wimer, 75 F. Supp. 955, 962 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
Nevertheless, the activities within the district must constitute "a substantial part of a defendant's
ordinary business [and] be continuous, and at least of some duration," and the burden is on the
plaintiff to support venue. United Indus. Corp. v. Nuclear Corp., 237 F. Supp. 971, 978-79 (D.
DeL 1964).
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